TABLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT CITATIONS
USED IN THE REFERENCE RE THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC
relying on the
Statutes and Regulations Cited
in the English version of the non-binding opinion

Constitution Act, 1867, preamble, ss. 91, 92(14), 96, 101.
Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 25, 35, 52(1), (2).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 2, 3, 4, 7 to 14, 15, 25, 33.

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217
 

Constitution Act, 1867, preamble, ss. 91, 92(14), 96, 101.  
PROVISION OF TEXT PARAGRAPHS, & TIMES MENTIONED CONTIGUOUS TEXT
     
preamble 44 x 1 A federal-provincial division of powers necessitated a written constitution which circumscribed the powers of the new Dominion and Provinces of Canada. Despite its federal structure, the new Dominion was to have "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom" (Constitution Act, 1867, preamble).
     
  51 x 1 Although these underlying principles are not explicitly made part of the Constitution by any written provision, other than in some respects by the oblique reference in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, it would be impossible to conceive of our constitutional structure without them.
     
  53 x 2 However, we also observed in the Provincial Judges Reference that the effect of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 was to incorporate certain constitutional principles by reference, a point made earlier in Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, at pp. 462-63.
     
    In the Provincial Judges Reference, at para. 104, we determined that the preamble "invites the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express terms of the constitutional text".
     
s. 91 47 x 1 It should be noted, parenthetically, that the 1982 amendments did not alter the basic division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which is the primary textual expression of the principle of federalism in our Constitution, agreed upon at Confederation. [...]
     
s. 92 11 x 1 It is also argued that this Court's original jurisdiction is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the original jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts and usurps the normal appellate process. However, Parliament's power to establish a general court of appeal pursuant to s. 101 is plenary, and takes priority over the province's power to control the administration of justice in s. 92(14). [...]
     
  47 x 1

It should be noted, parenthetically, that the 1982 amendments did not alter the basic division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which is the primary textual expression of the principle of federalism in our Constitution, agreed upon at Confederation. [...]

     
s. 92(14) 11 x 1 However, Parliament's power to establish a general court of appeal pursuant to s. 101 is plenary, and takes priority over the province's power to control the administration of justice in s. 92(14). [...]
     
s. 96 15 x 1 Parliament and the provincial legislatures may properly confer other legal functions on the courts, and may confer certain judicial functions on bodies that are not courts. The exception to this rule relates only to s. 96 courts.
     
s. 101 head notes x 3 Constitutional law -- Supreme Court of Canada -- Reference jurisdiction -- Whether Supreme Court's reference jurisdiction constitutional -- Constitution Act, 1867, s. 101 -- Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, s. 53.
     
    Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Parliament the authority to grant this Court the reference jurisdiction provided for in s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act.
     
    The words "general court of appeal" in s. 101 denote the status of the Court within the national court structure and should not be taken as a restrictive definition of the Court's functions.
     
  4 x 1 The amicus curiae argued that s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not give Parliament the authority to grant this Court the jurisdiction provided for in s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26.
     
  7 x 3 These two roles reflect the two heads of power enumerated in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
     
    However, the "laws of Canada" referred to in s. 101 consist only of federal law and statute: see Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, at pp. 1065-66.
     
    As a result, the phrase "additional courts" contained in s. 101 is an insufficient basis upon which to ground the special jurisdiction established in s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, which clearly exceeds a consideration of federal law alone (see, e.g., s. 53(2)).
     
  8 x 1 Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act is intra vires Parliament's power under s. 101 if, in "pith and substance", it is legislation in relation to the constitution or organization of a "general court of appeal".
     
  9 x 1 The words "general court of appeal" in s. 101 denote the status of the Court within the national court structure and should not be taken as a restrictive definition of the Court's functions.
     
  10 x 1 Although these courts are not constituted under a head of power similar to s. 101, they certainly provide examples which suggest that there is nothing inherently self-contradictory about an appellate court exercising original jurisdiction on an exceptional basis.
     
  11 x 1 However, Parliament's power to establish a general court of appeal pursuant to s. 101 is plenary, and takes priority over the province's power to control the administration of justice in s. 92(14). See Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).
     
Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 25, 35, 52(1), (2).  
     
s. 25 82 x 1 Consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35 explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s. 25, a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples.
     
s. 35 82 x 2 Consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35 explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s. 25, a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples.
     
    The "promise" of s. 35, as it was termed in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at p. 1083, recognized not only the ancient occupation of land by aboriginal peoples, but their contribution to the building of Canada, and the special commitments made to them by successive governments.
     
s. 52(1) 32 x 1 The "Constitution of Canada" certainly includes the constitutional texts enumerated in s. 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
     
s, 52(2) 72 x 1 The essence of constitutionalism in Canada is embodied in s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that "[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
     
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 2, 3, 4, 7 to 14, 15, 25, 33.  
     
s. 2 47 x 1 Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33, the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss. 7 to 14) and equality rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.
     
s. 3 65 x 1 In individual terms, the right to vote in elections to the House of Commons and the provincial legislatures, and to be candidates in those elections, is guaranteed to "Every citizen of Canada" by virtue of s. 3 of the Charter.
     
s. 4 65 x 2 In addition, the effect of s. 4 of the Charter is to oblige the House of Commons and the provincial legislatures to hold regular elections and to permit citizens to elect representatives to their political institutions.
     
    The democratic principle is affirmed with particular clarity in that s. 4 is not subject to the notwithstanding power contained in s. 33.
     
ss. 7 to 14 47 x 1 Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33, the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss. 7 to 14) and equality rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.
     
s. 15 47 x 1 Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33, the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss. 7 to 14) and equality rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.
     
s. 25 82 x 1 Consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35 explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s. 25, a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples.
     
s. 33 47 x 1 Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33, the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss. 7 to 14) and equality rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.
     
  65 x 1 The democratic principle is affirmed with particular clarity in that s. 4 is not subject to the notwithstanding power contained in s. 33.
     

THE WORDS "DEMOCRATIC" AND "DEMOCRACY"
USED IN THE REFERENCE RE THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC

PROVISION OF TEXT PARAGRAPH CONTIGUOUS TEXT
     
democratic Held x 7 The reference questions are justiciable and should be answered. They do not ask the Court to usurp any democratic decision that the people of Quebec may be called upon to make.
     
    The questions, as interpreted by the Court, are strictly limited to aspects of the legal framework in which that democratic decision is to be taken.
     
    A democratic decision of Quebecers in favour of secession would put those relationships at risk.
     
    Our democratic institutions necessarily accommodate a continuous process of discussion and evolution, which is reflected in the constitutional right of each participant in the federation to initiate constitutional change.
     
    A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recognize.
     
    The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.
     
    Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations.
     
  26 x 2 In exercising its discretion whether to determine a matter that is alleged to be non-justiciable, the Court's primary concern is to retain its proper role within the constitutional framework of our democratic form of government. . . .
     
    Thus the circumstances in which the Court may decline to answer a reference question on the basis of "non-justiciability" include:

     (i)  if to do so would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its proper role in the constitutional framework of our democratic form of government or

     
  27 x 2 As to the "proper role" of the Court, it is important to underline, contrary to the submission of the amicus curiae, that the questions posed in this Reference do not ask the Court to usurp any democratic decision that the people of Quebec may be called upon to make.
     
    The questions posed by the Governor in Council, as we interpret them, are strictly limited to aspects of the legal framework in which that democratic decision is to be taken.
     
  44 x 1 Allowing for the obvious differences between the governance of Canada and the United Kingdom, it was nevertheless thought important to thus emphasize the continuity of constitutional principles, including democratic institutions and the rule of law; and the continuity of the exercise of sovereign power transferred from Westminster to the federal and provincial capitals of Canada.
     
  48 x 1 We think it apparent from even this brief historical review that the evolution of our constitutional arrangements has been characterized by adherence to the rule of law, respect for democratic institutions, the accommodation of minorities, insistence that governments adhere to constitutional conduct and a desire for continuity and stability.
     
  58 x 1 The federal structure of our country also facilitates democratic participation by distributing power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving the particular societal objective having regard to this diversity.
     
  61 x 3 Democracy is a fundamental value in our constitutional law and political culture.
     
    While it has both an institutional and an individual aspect, the democratic principle was also argued before us in the sense of the supremacy of the sovereign will of a people, in this case potentially to be expressed by Quebecers in support of unilateral secession.
     
    It is useful to explore in a summary way these different aspects of the democratic principle.
     
  62 x 1 The representative and democratic nature of our political institutions was simply assumed.
     
  63 x 1 The evolution of our democratic tradition can be traced back to the Magna Carta (1215) and before, through the long struggle for Parliamentary supremacy which culminated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the emergence of representative political institutions in the colonial era, the development of responsible government in the 19th century, and eventually, the achievement of Confederation itself in 1867.
     
  64 x 3 Put another way, a sovereign people exercises its right to self-government through the democratic process.
     
    The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society which I believe to embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.
     
  65 x 1 The democratic principle is affirmed with particular clarity in that s. 4 is not subject to the notwithstanding power contained in s. 33.
     
  66 x 2 No one majority is more or less "legitimate" than the others as an expression of democratic opinion, although, of course, the consequences will vary with the subject matter.
     
    At the same time, Canada as a whole is also a democratic community in which citizens construct and achieve goals on a national scale through a federal government acting within the limits of its jurisdiction.
     
  67 x 3 The consent of the governed is a value that is basic to our understanding of a free and democratic society.
     
    To be accorded legitimacy, democratic institutions must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation.
     
    A political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our political culture, that requires an interaction between the rule of law and the democratic principle.
     
  68 x 2 The Constitution mandates government by democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable to them, "resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion and the interplay of ideas" (Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, at p. 330).
     
    A democratic system of government is committed to considering those dissenting voices, and seeking to acknowledge and address those voices in the laws by which all in the community must live.
     
  69 x 2 The Constitution Act, 1982 gives expression to this principle, by conferring a right to initiate constitutional change on each participant in Confederation. In our view, the existence of this right imposes a corresponding duty on the participants in Confederation to engage in constitutional discussions in order to acknowledge and address democratic expressions of a desire for change in other provinces.
     
    This duty is inherent in the democratic principle which is a fundamental predicate of our system of governance.
     
  74 x 2 Although democratic government is generally solicitous of those rights, there are occasions when the majority will be tempted to ignore fundamental rights in order to accomplish collective goals more easily or effectively.
     
    That purpose would be defeated if one of those democratically elected levels of government could usurp the powers of the other simply by exercising its legislative power to allocate additional political power to itself unilaterally.
     
  78 x 3 It might be objected, then, that constitutionalism is therefore incompatible with democratic government.
     
   

Constitutionalism facilitates -- indeed, makes possible -- a democratic political system by creating an orderly framework within which people may make political  decisions.

     
    Without that relationship, the political will upon which democratic decisions are taken would itself be undermined.
     
  86 x 1 The supposed juridical basis for such an act is said to be a clear expression of democratic will in a referendum in the province of Quebec.
     
  87 x 5 Although the Constitution does not itself address the use of a referendum procedure, and the results of a referendum have no direct role or legal effect in our constitutional scheme, a referendum undoubtedly may provide a democratic method of ascertaining the views of the electorate on important political questions on a particular occasion.
     
    The democratic principle identified above would demand that considerable weight be given to a clear expression by the people of Quebec of their will to secede from Canada, even though a referendum, in itself and without more, has no direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral secession.
     
    Our political institutions are premised on the democratic principle,
     
    and so an expression of the democratic will of the people of a province carries weight, in that it would confer legitimacy on the efforts of the government of Quebec to initiate the Constitution's amendment process in order to secede by constitutional means. In this context, we refer to a "clear" majority as a qualitative evaluation.
     
    The referendum result, if it is to be taken as an expression of the democratic will, must be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it achieves.
     
  88 x 4 The federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle, dictates that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire.
     
    In Canada, the initiative for constitutional amendment is the responsibility of democratically elected representatives of the participants in Confederation.
     
    Those representatives may, of course, take their cue from a referendum, but in legal terms, constitution-making in Canada, as in many countries, is undertaken by the democratically elected representatives of the people.
     
   

The clear repudiation by the people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles already discussed.

     
  90 x 1 This proposition is attributed either to the supposed implications of the democratic principle of the Constitution, or to the international law principle of self-determination of peoples.
     
  92 x 1 This would amount to the assertion that other constitutionally recognized principles necessarily trump the clearly expressed democratic will of the people of Quebec.
     
     
  99 x 1 In exercising its discretion whether to determine a matter that is alleged to be non-justiciable, the Court's primary concern is to retain its proper role within the constitutional framework of our democratic form of government.
     
     
  100 x 2 A right and a corresponding duty to negotiate secession cannot be built on an alleged expression of democratic will  
     
    if the expression of democratic will is itself fraught with ambiguities.
     
  101 x 1

Having established the legal framework, it would be for the democratically elected leadership of the various participants to resolve their differences.

     
  139 x 1 However, the concern of aboriginal peoples is precipitated by the asserted right of Quebec to unilateral secession. In light of our finding that there is no such right applicable to the population of Quebec, either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law, but that on the contrary a clear democratic expression of support for secession would lead under the Constitution to negotiations in which aboriginal interests would be taken into account, it becomes unnecessary to explore further the concerns of the aboriginal peoples in this Reference.
     
  149 x 1 A democratic decision of Quebecers in favour of secession would put those relationships at risk.
     
  150 x 2 The Constitution is not a straitjacket. Even a brief review of our constitutional history demonstrates periods of momentous and dramatic change. Our democratic institutions necessarily accommodate a continuous process of discussion and evolution, which is reflected in the constitutional right of each participant in the federation to initiate constitutional change.
     
    While it is true that some attempts at constitutional amendment in recent years have faltered, a clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recognize.
     
  151 x 2

They couldn't resist any longer, look what they've done: "democratic vote": And in a referendum to destroy the country.  In case the hypnosis of "democratic" and "democracy" and "elected representatives" didn't take hold, they have spit it out. A 100% unlawful judicial constitutional amendment from the Haig case [1993], which is spun around and overturned again in the Sauvé [2002] case. The sole purpose of the Reference re the Secession of Quebec is to sucker everyone into voting to destroy the country they already planned to take down and have been taking down for decades to attach it to the USA and Mexico under a military perimeter called NORTHCOM to control us with martial law when we find we have had our country and our "democracy" stolen out from under from us.

The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.
     
    Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations.
     
  154 x 4 We have also considered whether a positive legal entitlement to secession exists under international law in the factual circumstances contemplated by Question 1, i.e., a clear democratic expression of support on a clear question for Quebec secession.
     
democracy Held x 4 A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles animating the whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.
     
    Arguments in support of the existence of such a right were primarily based on the principle of democracy.
     
    Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule. Constitutional jurisprudence shows that democracy exists in the larger context of other constitutional values.
     
    The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations.
     
  Authors cited x 1 MacLauchlan, H. Wade. "Accounting for Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Quebec Secession Reference" (1997), 76 Can. Bar Rev. 155.
     
  32 x 1 In our view, there are four fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution which are relevant to addressing the question before us (although this enumeration is by no means exhaustive): federalism; democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law; and respect for minorities.
     
  42 x 1 Quoted in H. Wade MacLauchlan, "Accounting for Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Quebec Secession Reference" (1997), 76 Can. Bar Rev. 155, at p. 168.)
     
  49 x 1 The following discussion addresses the four foundational constitutional principles that are most germane for resolution of this Reference: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minority rights.
     
  60 +     (c) Democracy
     
  61 Democracy is a fundamental value in our constitutional law and political culture.
     
  62 x 3 The principle of democracy has always informed the design of our constitutional structure, and continues to act as an essential interpretive consideration to this day.
     
    As is apparent from an earlier line of decisions emanating from this Court, including Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285, Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265, and Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, the democracy principle can best be understood as a sort of baseline against which the framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have always operated.
     
    As explained in the Provincial Judges Reference, supra, at para. 100, it is evident that our Constitution contemplates that Canada shall be a constitutional democracy.
     
  63 x 2 Democracy is commonly understood as being a political system of majority rule.
     
    "[T]he Canadian tradition", the majority of this Court held in Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at p. 186, is "one of evolutionary democracy moving in uneven steps toward the goal of universal suffrage and more effective representation".
     
  64 x 3 Democracy is not simply concerned with the process of government.
     
    On the contrary, as suggested in Switzman v. Elbling, supra, at p. 306, democracy is fundamentally connected to substantive goals, most importantly, the promotion of self-government.
     
    Democracy accommodates cultural and group identities: Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, at p. 188.In considering the scope and purpose of the Charter, the Court in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, articulated some of the values inherent in the notion of democracy (at p. 136):
     
  65 x In institutional terms, democracy means that each of the provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament is elected by popular franchise.
     
    Historically, this Court has interpreted democracy to mean the process of representative and responsible government and the right of citizens to participate in the political process as voters (Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, supra) and as candidates (Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876).
     
  66 x 2  It is, of course, true that democracy expresses the sovereign will of the people.
     
    The relationship between democracy and federalism means, for example, that in Canada there may be different and equally legitimate majorities in different provinces and territories and at the federal level.
     
  67 x 1 Yet democracy in any real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule of law.
     
  68 x 1 Finally, we highlight that a functioning democracy requires a continuous process of discussion.
     
  75 x 2 The argument that the Constitution may be legitimately circumvented by resort to a majority vote in a province-wide referendum is superficially persuasive, in large measure because it seems to appeal to some of the same principles that underlie the legitimacy of the Constitution itself, namely, democracy and self-government.
     
    However, closer analysis reveals that this argument is unsound, because it misunderstands the meaning of popular sovereignty and the essence of a constitutional democracy.
     
  76 x 1 Our principle of democracy, taken in conjunction with the other constitutional principles discussed here, is richer.
     
  77 x 1 In this way, our belief in democracy may be harmonized with our belief in constitutionalism.
     
  78 x 1 Viewed correctly, constitutionalism and the rule of law are not in conflict with democracy; rather, they are essential to it.
    Humpty Dumpty couldn't have said it better.
     
  90 x 1 The conduct of the parties in such negotiations would be governed by the same constitutional principles which give rise to the duty to negotiate: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities.
     
  91 x 2 The democracy principle, as we have emphasized, cannot be invoked to trump the principles of federalism and rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities,
     
    or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.
     
  92 x 1 Such a proposition fails to give sufficient weight to the underlying constitutional principles that must inform the amendment process, including the principles of democracy and federalism.
     
  148 x 1 A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles that animate the whole of our Constitution, including the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.
     
  149 x 4 Those who support the existence of such a right found their case primarily on the principle of democracy.
     
    Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule.
     
    As reflected in our constitutional jurisprudence, democracy exists in the larger context of other constitutional values such as those already mentioned. In the 131 years since Confederation, the people of the provinces and territories have created close ties of interdependence (economically, socially, politically and culturally) based on shared values that include federalism,
     
    democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.
     
  151 x 1

 

The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations.
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     

You think they want us to think about "democracy"?  This isn't law; it's an exercise in mass hypnosis by a Supreme Court largely appointed by Mulroney, Mr. Free Trade and NAFTA, and this Court is helping to dissolve this country in order to annex it to the USA and Mexico.

Try this:  The "caught you in the act" principle.

Supreme Court in Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 : "Held (Lamer C.J. and Iacobucci J. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. The federal Referendum Act and the Canada Elections Act are constitutional. The appellant's exclusion from the federal referendum did not violate his rights under ss. 2(b), 3 and 15(1) of the Charter."

Supreme Court in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, [Gonthier J.]: "[...] it is clear that there was no breach of s. 3 of the Charter in that case since s. 3 does not apply to referenda [...]"  [Section 3 being the "democratic vote"]

If the vote in a referendum is NOT a constitutional section 3 democratic vote and "decision" or "sovereign will" of the people in Haig [1993] and then later in Sauvé [2002], then how and why does it temporarily become one in the intervening case of the Reference re the Secession of Quebec in 1998Haig was a constitutional case, the decision is part of the rock-solid immoveable content of the Constitution. It would take Parliament to amend the Constitution to change the fact that the vote in a referendum is not the democratic section 3 vote of the Charter; and then it would take another amendment to change it back again for the Sauvé case 5 years after the Reference re the Secession of Quebec.  Which, moreover, has been "given effect" in the Clarity Act, a so-called federal law compelling Parliament to negotiate the end of the country based on a bogus vote in a referendum. In other words, judicial and Parliamentary treason.

The Supreme Court of Mulroney in 1998, by repeatedly, incessantly juxtaposing the words "democratic" and "will", "democratic" and "sovereign will" of the people, "democratic" and "decision" with "democratically elected" representatives, the Secession Reference is a blatant exercise in deep hypnosis to facilitate deep integration of Canada into the USA and Mexico.

It's an exercise in mesmerisation to convince the legal community and the general public that a vote in a referendum is a democratic section 3 vote under the Constitution.

This is a cheap marketing trick, it isn't law or legal reasoning.

There is a huge deal of difference between a "democratic" process or form used to conduct affairs under the Constitution, and a "democratic decision" of Quebecers or anyone else in a referendum -- because the Haig case so decided.

But in the Secession Reference, the Court is hell-bent on making the referendum vote INTO a section 3 "democratic vote" and "decision" of the "sovereign will" of the people as a pretext to trigger the bogus negotiations by compelling Parliament to commit treason, for in fact there are no negotiations, there is a plan, the plan is being implemented clearly and systematically despite the No in 1980 and the No in 1995. The plan is to destroy Canada and make the citizens look like the suckers who did it.

The Reference re the Secession of Quebec is judicial fraud, quackery and treason.

(c) Kathleen Moore, Montreal, Canada, 24 January 2006.  Kathleen_Moore@hotmail.com